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PRISONERS' RIGHTS-FEDERAL WITNESS PROCESS-STATE TREASURY
MUST BEAR EXPENSES OF TRANSPORTING STATE PRISONER
WITNESS BETWEEN COUNTY JAIL AND FEDERAL
COURTHOUSE WHEN SUCH PRISONER
TESTIFIES IN FEDERAL
PROCEEDINGS
Garland v. Sullivan (1984)
Prisoners' civil rights actions' have become a significant portion of
the federal caseload during the last twenty-five years.2 Apart from gen-
eral concern over crowded federal dockets,3 the circuit courts of appeals
have struggled to interpret the authority of federal courts to allocate
state and federal responsibilities for the transportation and custody of
state prisoners who testify as witnesses at federal proceedings. 4 In Gar-
1. Frequently, such actions are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which pro-
vides a federal cause of action for any person deprived of constitutional or statu-
tory rights by another person acting under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982). Section 1983 specifies that:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia
shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
2. See ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, tables 20, 21, 29 (1981). In 1981, 16,473 civil rights cases were
filed by state and federal prisoners as compared to 296 suits initiated in 1961.
ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
table C2 (1981).
3. See, e.g., Aldisert, Section 1983, Comity & Federal Caseload, 1973 LAw & Soc.
ORD. 557, 566 ("[P]risoners' petitions continue to inundate the federal courts
... [t]his litigious flood consumes many judicial manhours and challenges the
abilities of federal courts to cope with their own calendars."); Coffin,Justice and
Workability: Un Essai, 5 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 567, 570 (1970) ("[a] judge is
tempted to conclude that the chief weapon expected to forestall Orwell's 1984 is
the United States Code's § 1983").
4. See Ford v. Allen, 728 F.2d 1369 (11 th Cir. 1984) (order requiring Mar-
shals Service to bear full cost of transportation upheld); Wiggins v. County of
Alameda, 717 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1983) (deciding district court has broad discre-
tion to apportion costs of transporting state prisoner to federal courts), cert. de-
nied, 104 S. Ct. 1425 (1984); Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1977)
(upholding district court order requiring state to transport prisoners from regu-
lar jail to local jail near federal courthouse and requiring marshals to transport
prisoners from local jail to federal courthouse). For a further discussion of the
(1060)
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land v. Sullivan,5 the Third Circuit created a split among the circuits
when it held that a district court has statutory authority to order a
United States marshal to maintain custody of a state prisoner witness
while he testifies in the federal courthouse, 6 but that, absent a finding of
special security risks, a district court lacks statutory authority to order a
United States marshal to transport a state prisoner witness between the
county jail and federal courthouse. 7 Accordingly, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that the district court in Garland could not shift the expense of
producing a witness from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to the
United States Treasury.
8
The issue of whether the state or the federal treasury should bear
the expenses of complying with federal witness process 9 arose in a civil
Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits' decisions, see infra notes 52, 61-64 & 68 and
accompanying text.
5. 737 F.2d 1283 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Pennsylvania Bureau of Cor-
rection v. United States Marshals Service, 54 U.S.L.W. 4001, 4002 (U.S. Nov. 19,
1985). As this issue of the Villanova Law Review went to press, the United States
Supreme Court affirmed the Garland decision. The Court held that federal dis-
trict courts lack statutory authority to order United States marshals to assume
custody of state prisoners outside the federal courthouse.
6. 737 F.2d at 1284. See 28 U.S.C. § 569(a) (1982). Section 569 sets forth
the duties and powers of United States marshals, specifically providing that
(a) The United States marshal of each district is the marshal of
the district court and of the court of appeals when sitting in his district,
and of the Court of International Trade holding sessions in his district
elsewhere than in the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, and
may, in the discretion of the respective courts, be required to attend
any session of court.
(b) United States marshals shall execute all lawful writs, process
and orders issued under authority of the United States, including thoze
of the courts and Government of the Canal Zone, and command all
necessary assistance to execute their duties.
(c) The Attorney General shall supervise and direct United States
marshals in the performance of public duties and accounting for public
moneys. Each marshal shall report his official proceedings, receipts
and disbursements and the condition of his office as the Attorney Gen-
eral directs.
Id. For a further discussion of the marshals' custodial duties, see infra notes 18-
28 and accompanying text.
7. 737 F.2d at 1288. The Third Circuit's holding rested on its analysis of
28 U.S.C. §§ 569(a) and 1651. Section 1651, known as the All Writs Act, pro-
vides: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982). For
a further discussion of the All Writs Act, see infra note 43 and accompanying
text. For the text of section 569(a), see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
8. 737 F.2d at 1287. The Third Circuit's decision in Garland is contrary to
the decisions of other circuits that have addressed the issue of allocating the
costs of transporting prisoner witnesses. For a discussion of the decisions on
this issue by the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, see supra note 4 and infra
notes 52, 61-64 & 68 and accompanying text.
9. Ordinarily, to obtain a witness for a federal trial, the court issues a sub-
poena, which is "a command to appear at a certain time and place to give testi-
2
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rights action by a state prisoner, Richard Garland, against various Phila-
delphia prison officials.' 0 The presiding magistrate" issued an order
directing the United States marshal to transfer a state prisoner witness
from a county jail to the United States courthouse in Philadelphia and to
maintain custody of that prisoner while he was in the federal court-
house.' 2 The United States Marshals Service, as an intervenor, moved
for reconsideration of that order.1 3 The magistrate denied the motion
for reconsideration and the Marshals Service appealed.
14
Writing for the Third Circuit, 15 Judge Gibbons considered whether
the state or federal treasury should bear the expenses of transporting
mony upon a certain matter." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1279 (5th ed. 1979). If,
however, the witness is a prisoner, the court must issue a writ of habeas corpus
ad testificandum directing the custodian to bring the prisoner witness to court to
testify. 28 U.S.C. § 224 1(c)(5) (1982). Section 224 1(c)(5) provides that the writ
of habeas corpus ad testificandum shall not extend to a prisoner unless "[i]t is
necessary to bring him into court to testify or for trial." Id. For a discussion of
the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, see generally R. SOKOL, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS 28-84 (1969).
Section 2241(a) provides that "[w]rits of habeas corpus may be granted by
the Supreme Court, any justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge
within their respective jurisdictions." 28 U.S.C. § 224 1(a) (1982). Section 2254
provides authority for the review of applications for a writ of habeas corpus
while section 2255 refers to applications by federal prisoners. Id. §§ 2254, 2255
(1982).
10. Garland v. Sullivan, No. 80-2350 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10, 1983). See Brief for
Intervenor-Appellant Marshals Service at 4-5, Garland v. Sullivan, 737 F.2d
1283 (available at Villanova Law Review office). While incarcerated at Holmes-
burg Prison in Philadelphia, plaintiff Richard Garland brought a civil rights suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Philadelphia County Sheriff, several depu-
ties, a Philadelphia prison warden and certain prison guards (all Philadelphia
county officials). Id. at 4. Garland alleged that these officials violated his civil
rights by beating and harassing him. Id. In response to Garland's request for
himself and eight other prisoners to testify at his trial, the magistrate issued the
writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum, which led to the present dispute. Id. at
4-5.
11. Trial by a United States magistrate is permitted where, as in this case,
the parties so consent. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982).
12. 737 F.2d at 1284.
13. Id. The Bureau of Corrections, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the
Sheriff of Philadelphia County, and the City of Philadelphia also intervened. Id.
14. Id. The courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review final orders ema-
nating from cases tried by consent of the parties before a United States magis-
trate. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) (1982).
Section 636(c)(3) provides that "[u]pon entry of judgment in any case re-
ferred under paragraph (1) of this subsection, an aggrieved party may appeal
directly to the appropriate United States court of appeals from the judgment of
the magistrate in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of a
district court." Id.
15. The case was heard by Circuit Judges Gibbons and Becker and District
Judge Atkins of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, sitting by designation. Judge Gibbons wrote for the majority. Judge
Becker filed a separate opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
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prisoner witnesses and maintaining their safe custody while they testify
in federal court.' 6 At the outset, Judge Gibbons noted that the federal
judiciary cannot order any expenditure by the federal treasury without
statutory authority.' 7 Judge Gibbons next pointed out that 28 U.S.C.
§ 569(a) authorizes the trial court to require the marshal to attend any
session of court,' 8 and that, therefore, section 569(a) in effect delegates
responsibility for courthouse security to the marshals. 19 While conced-
ing responsibility for courthouse security, the Marshals Service con-
tended that section 569(a) should not be construed to relieve state
custodians of their ongoing duty to maintain prisoner witnesses in se-
cure custody.2 0 The Garland court, however, decided that in the interest
of security and flexibility, federal trial courts have the power under sec-
tion 569(a) to order marshals to assume custody of prisoner witnesses
while they are in the federal courthouse to testify. 2 1 The court specifi-
cally noted that no finding of special security risks would be necessary to
16. 737 F.2d at 1285. The only issue on appeal from the underlying action
was the authority of a district court judge or magistrate to shift any part of the
burden of complying with federal process from the state to the federal treasury.
Id.
17. Id. The Constitution specifically provides that "[n]o Money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of appropriations made by Law
.... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
18. 737 F.2d at 1287.
19. Id. The court relied on its earlier decision in Story v. Robinson, in which
the Third Circuit held that a federal trial court may order marshals to take pris-
oner witnesses into custody while the marshal's attendance in court is required.
689 F.2d 1176, 1180 (3d Cir. 1982). In Story, the District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania, in a pending civil case, issued a writ of habeas corpus ad
testificandum to the state custodian. Id. at 1177. The writ ordered the state
custodian to transport state prisoner witnesses to the state institution nearest
the federal courthouse. Id. The court also ordered the United States Marshals
Service to transport these witnesses to and from the state institution for their
court appearances as witnesses in a federal trial. Id. The court's order reflected
the historical practice of the Western District of Pennsylvania. Id. at 1178. The
Marshals Service, faced with severe financial difficulties, sought to be relieved of
all expenses for the production of state prisoner witnesses. Id.
In Story, the Third Circuit at the outset recognized that 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241(c) (5) and 165 1(a) authorized the federal courts to issue writs of habeas
corpus ad testificandum to compel the production of prisoner witnesses. Id.
Although conceding the court's power to issue such a writ, the Marshals Service
alleged that it had no duty to respond unless the state custodian first refused to
execute the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. Id. at 1179. The Third Cir-
cuit accepted this contention. Id.
Thus, the Third Circuit ultimately resolved the issue by following the dis-
trict court's historical practice and relying on § 569(a) to hold that "state custo-
dians will be in compliance with writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum for state
prisoner witnesses if they transport the prisoners to the county jail nearest the
federal courthouse and notify the United States Marshals." Id. at 1181 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 569(a) (1982)).
20. 737 F.2d at 1287.
21. Id.
4
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justify such an order.22
Judge Gibbons drew a distinction based on federal security interests
between ordering federal custody of witnesses in the federal courthouse
and ordering federal custody of witnesses at a point outside the federal
courthouse. 2 3 Judge Gibbons invoked a presumption that "there is no
federal court security interest until state prisoners are delivered to the
custody of the Marshal of the district at the federal courthouse." '24
By adopting this presumption, the court implicitly overruled its ear-
lier decision in Story v. Robinson.2 5 In Story, the court held that the Mar-
shals Service was required to assume custody of prisoner witnesses
outside the federal courthouse. 26 Judge Gibbons, in Garland, stated that
the presumption that no federal court security interest existed until de-
livery of state prisoners to marshals at the federal courthouse could be
overcome by a showing that the witness is particularly dangerous or that
the witness' own personal safety is in jeopardy. 27 Thus, the court con-
cluded that "unless a federal trial court makes a specific finding that spe-
cial security circumstances exist which require an order that state
prisoner witnesses be taken into the Marshal's custody at a situs away
from the federal courthouse, section 569(a) does not authorize such an
order." 2 8
As the trial court did not make a finding of special security risks in
Garland, the Third Circuit held that the trial court lacked statutory au-
thority for its order requiring the Marshals Service to assume the finan-
cial responsibility for transporting the prisoner witness from the county
jail to the federal courthouse.2 9 Explaining this part of the holding,
Judge Gibbons first noted that in Story the Third Circuit had concluded
that no statute required the court to allocate to the Marshals Service the
cost of transporting state prisoner witnesses to the federal courthouse.3 0
22. Id. The Third Circuit explained that the trial court may order the mar-
shal to take custody without making a finding regarding special security risks. Id.
Accordingly, the court noted that such orders are within the broad discretion of
the trial court. Id. Moreover, the court recognized that "this case presents one
of those rare instances in which the trial courts must be recognized as having
virtually unreviewable discretion." Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1287-88.
25. 689 F.2d 1176 (3d Cir. 1982). For a discussion of the Story decision, see
supra note 19.
26. Id, at 1181.
27. 737 F.2d at 1288. The court noted that the presence of special security
risks that could require federal marshals to take custody of a state prisoner wit-
ness outside the federal courthouse would be the exception, rather than the
rule. Id.
28. Id. Judge Gibbons noted that "[o]bviously the security problem outside
the courthouse is of an entirely different order of magnitude than that within."
Id. at 1287.
29. Id. at 1286-87.
30. Id. at 1285-86. The Garland court relied heavily on Story in holding that
1064 [Vol. 30: p. 1060
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After examining the statutory authority, Judge Gibbons decided that
even a discretionary order making such an allocation of cost to the Mar-
shals Service was not within the power of the trial court.3 ' In reaching
this decision, Judge Gibbons recognized that a writ of habeas corpus ad
testificandum, the order initially issued by the magistrate, requires that
the custodian produce a prisoner witness at trial. 32 Judge Gibbons stated
that prison officials, not the United States marshals, are the traditional
custodians of state prisoners. 33 Since the marshals are not custodians,
Judge Gibbons reasoned that the marshals are inappropriate respon-
dents to writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum.
3 4
Thus deciding that the magistrate's order directed to the United
States marshal could not be a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum,
Judge Gibbons posited that the appropriate order to compel the compli-
ance of the marshal must be in the form of mandamus. 35 But, relying on
28 U.S.C. §§ 569(b), 571, 567(2), and 1651 do not require shifting the burden
of cost to the federal government. Id. Supported by Stoy, the court concluded
that § 569(b) "was not a separate source ofjudicial authority to issue writs, pro-
cess, and orders, but only a source of the Marshals' duty to execute them when
they have been issued pursuant to some other source of authority." Id. at 1285
(citing Story, 689 F.2d at 1179). For the text of § 569(b), see supra note 6.
In accordance with Stoy, the Garland court also held that § 571 did not fur-
nish authority to relieve state custodians of the duty to comply with federal wit-
ness process. Id. Section 571(a) provides that "[t]he United States marshals,
under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, shall pay the salaries, of-
fice expenses and travel and per diem allowances of United States attorneys,
their assistants, clerks and messengers, of the marshals, their deputies and cleri-
cal assistants." 28 U.S.C. § 571(a) (1982). Although § 571 authorizes the mar-
shals to act as disbursing officers for the United States Attorney and federal
court personnel, the court concluded that this does not relieve state custodians
of their duty of compliance with federal witness process. 737 F.2d at 1285.
The court also rejected § 567(2) as an independent grant of authority to
relieve the state of the expense of transporting prisoner witnesses. Id. Section
567(2) provides that "[u]nder regulations prescribed by the Attorney General,
each United States marshal shall be allowed the expense of transporting prison-
ers, including the cost of necessary guards and the travel and subsistence ex-
pense of prisoners and guards." 28 U.S.C. § 567(2) (1982). Finally, the Garland
court dismissed the contention that § 1651 requires an order that the Marshals
Service assume costs of transporting prisoner witnesses. 737 F.2d at 1286. For
the text of § 1651, see supra note 7.
31. 737 F.2d at 1286.
32. Id. Section 2243 requires the writ to "be directed to the person having
custody of the person detained." 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1982). This requirement
has been expanded to mean that (1) the proper party respondent should be the
petitioner's immediate custodian, (2) the respondent should have the power to
produce the body of the petitioner before the court, and (3) the respondent may
be required to be within the issuing court's jurisdiction. R. SOKOL, supra note 9,
at 81.
33. 737 F.2d at 1286.
34. Id.
35. Id. "Mandamus" is defined by translation as "we command." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 866 (5th ed. 1979). This extraordinary writ has been codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1361, which provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or
6
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prior case law, Judge Gibbons acknowledged that the lower federal
courts do not have the authority to mandamus federal executive officers,
such as United States marshals. 36 Unable to find any statutory authority
for the magistrate's order to the marshal, Judge Gibbons concluded that
the cost of producing the witness could not be shifted from the state to
the "deeper pocket" of the federal treasury. 3 7 The Third Circuit ac-
cordingly reversed the magistrate's order insofar as it required the mar-
shals to produce the prisoner witness and bear the costs of doing so. 38
Judge Becker concurred in the judgment of the court but, con-
cerned about the split it created among the circuit courts of appeals, and
forseeing problems of judicial administration, wrote separately to dis-
cuss perceived weaknesses in the court's reasoning.39
Judge Becker agreed that writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum
traditionally have bound only the custodian to bring the prisoner witness
into court and that modification of these writs to permit transfer of cus-
tody to federal officials before arrival at the courthouse was impermissi-
ble. 40 Judge Becker contrasted the court's traditional and rigid
employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to
the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982).
36. 737 F.2d at 1286. In Garland, the Third Circuit relied on two Supreme
Court cases, Mclntire v. Wood and McClung v. Silliman, for the proposition that the
All Writs Act is not a source of authority to mandamus federal executive officers.
Id. (citing McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821); McIntire v.
Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813)). In Mclntire, the plaintiff filed a motion
for a writ of mandamus to the register of the land office in Ohio commanding
him to grant final certificates of sale to McIntire for the land. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
at 504-05. The circuit court was split on whether to issue the writ and appealed
to the Supreme Court. Id. at 504. The Supreme Court ruled that the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ of mandamus. Id. at 505. The Court
held that § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the predecessor to the All Writs Act,
did not provide a source of substantive authority to mandamus federal executive
officials. Id.; See 737 F.2d at 1286.
The facts and the parties in McClung were identical to Mclntire. 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) at 598. After the decision in Mclntire, the same plaintiff filed suit in the
state courts of Ohio and again moved for a writ of mandamus from the circuit
court to order the federal land office register to give him final certificates of sale.
Id. In the course of reviewing a state court's power to issue a writ of mandamus
against a federal official, the Supreme Court again noted that the federal circuit
courts lacked the power to issue such a writ. Id. at 605. Since no other court has
been delegated this power, the Supreme Court apparently retained sole jurisdic-
tion to issue writs of mandamus against federal executive officials. Id. at 604;
737 F.2d at 1286.
37. 737 F.2d at 1287. For a discussion of the concerns surrounding a
state's inability to pay for witness production, see infra notes 54-60 and accom-
panying text.
38. Id. at 1288.
39. Id. (Becker, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 1288-89 (Becker, J., concurring). Judge Becker stated, "There is
no provision anywhere in traditional authority that permits modifications of this
writ [of habeas corpus ad testificandum] to allow custody to be transferred to
federal officials before the courthouse is reached." Id. at 1289 (Becker, J.,
concurring).
1066 [Vol. 30: p. 1060
7
Gregor: Prisoners' Rights - Federal Witness Process - State Treasury Must
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
application of the writ of habeas corpus with the flexible nature of the
All Writs Act.4 ' While noting that the All Writs Act gives courts the
authority to create new writs to satisfy new needs, Judge Becker ac-
knowledged that the authority conferred by the All Writs Act was limited
with respect to processes defined by the forms and doctrines of already
existing writs. 4 2 Accordingly, Judge Becker concluded that the existing
statutory authority for writs of habeas corpus precluded a district court
from issuing a nearly identical writ under the All Writs Act.43 Neverthe-
less, Judge Becker stated that the magistrate might have issued a tradi-
tional writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum with a supplemental writ,
"arguably in the nature of mandamus," directing the marshals to assume
responsibility for transporting the witness. 44
Judge Becker next considered whether the district court had author-
ity to issue a writ of mandamus against the Marshals Service. 4 5 Judge
Becker noted that despite strong ties between the marshals and the fed-
eral judiciary, marshals remain federal executive officials. 4 6 He reluc-
tantly acknowledged that the power of federal courts other than the
Supreme Court to mandamus such officials is precluded by the "hoary"
Supreme Court cases of Mclntire v. Wood 47 and McClung v. Silliman.
48
41. Id. at 1289 (Becker, J., concurring). See also Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S.
266, 282 (1948) (uses and forms of habeas corpus writ are not limited to those
forms existing in 1789 but must expand to achieve "the rational ends of law"
(quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 273 (1942)));
accord United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 172 (1977) ("This
Court has repeatedly recognized the power of a federal court to issue such com-
mands under the All Writs Act as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate
and prevent the frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of
jurisdiction otherwise obtained .... ").
42. 737 F.2d at 1289 (Becker, J., concurring).
43. Id. Judge Becker summarized:
To rephrase the matter in statutory parlance, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5)
(1982), which gives federal courts authority to issue writs of habeas
corpus ad testificandum, may preclude reliance on 28 U.S.C. § 1651
(1982) (the All Writs Act in modern garb) to create processes that
mimic section 2241 writs in most of their features but which speak with
their own voice on several critical issues.
Id.
44. Id. at 1290 (Becker, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 1290-91 (Becker, J., concurring).
46. Id. at 1291 (Becker, J., concurring). In classifying marshals as executive
officials, Judge Becker relied on 28 U.S.C. §§ 561(a) and 569(c). Id. (citing 28
U.S.C. §§ 561(a), 569(c) (1982)). Section 561(a) provides that the President of
the United States shall appoint the marshal for every judicial district. 28 U.S.C.
§ 561 (a) (1982). Section 569(c) provides that the Attorney General will oversee
the marshals' performance of their public duties. 28 U.S.C. § 569(c) (1982).
47. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813). For a discussion of Mclntire, see supra
note 36.
48. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 598 (1821). In McClung, the Supreme Court noted
that a federal court of original jurisdiction could not issue a writ of mandamus
against a federal executive official. Id. at 605. For a further discussion of Mc-
Clung, see supra note 36.
106719851
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Compelled by the "dead hand of precedent," Judge Becker concurred in
the judgment but made clear his opinion that the outcome was undesir-
able because it would detract from the federal courts' flexibility in ad-
ministering cases involving the vindication of civil rights.4 9 In closing,
Judge Becker noted that the issue in Garland was ripe for Supreme Court
review or legislative action.
50
In a brief separate opinion, Judge Atkins concurred in the court's
holding that in the interests of courthouse security the trial court may
order the marshal to take custody of prisoner witnesses while they are in
the federal courthouse to testify.5 1 However, because he agreed with
contrary decisions by the Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, 52 Judge
49. 737 F.2d at 1291 (Becker, J., concurring). Judge Becker expressed con-
cern that the majority's holding would impair the federal courts' ability to con-
duct accurate factfinding, especially in prisoner rights cases. Id. Judge Becker
feared that valuable testimony might be lost simply because either the state or
the Marshals Service would be unable to bear the costs of production of prisoner
witnesses. Id. For a discussion of the possible impact of these economic con-
straints on prisoners' rights, see infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
50. 737 F.2d at 1292 (Becker, J., concurring). Judge Becker recognized
that a split in opinion existed among the circuits, thereby making the question of
lower federal court authority over the marshals service worthy of Supreme Court
review. Id. Justice Rehnquist suggested that the specific issue in Garland was
worthy of review in his dissent from a denial of certiorari in a factually similar
case. See California Dept. of Corrections v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1425 (1984)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from a denial of certiorari). The Supreme Court re-
cently agreed with Justice Rehnquist, granting certiorari in the instant case ear-
lier this year. Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction v. United States Marshals
Serv., 105 S. Ct. 1166 (1985).
51. 737 F.2d at 1292 (Atkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
For a discussion of the court's holding, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
52. 737 F.2d at 1292 (Atkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Ford v. Allen, 728 F.2d 1369 (11 th Cir. 1984); Wiggins v. County of Ala-
meda, 717 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1425 (1984); Ballard
v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1977)).
In Ballard, the Fifth Circuit upheld a cost-splitting order similar to the one
in Garland. 557 F.2d at 481. The trial court in Ballard ordered the state of Flor-
ida to transport state prisoners from their regular jail to local county jails near
the federal courthouse. Id. at 481. The trial court then ordered the federal mar-
shals to assume responsibility for transporting prisoners from the county jail to
the courthouse. Id.
In sustaining this order, the Fifth Circuit relied on 28 U.S.C. §§ 567 and
569, as well as 28 C.F.R. 0.111 (b). The Ballard court noted that marshals may
"be required to attend any session of court * * * execute all lawful writs ... and
command all necessary assistance to execute their duties." Id. at 481 (citing 28
U.S.C. § 569(a)(b)(1982)). The court also noted that § 567 and 28 C.F.R.
§ 0.111 (b) authorize the payment of money for expenses incurred by marshals in
the performance of their duties. Id.
Section 567(2) provides that "each United States marshal shall be allowed
the expense of transporting prisoners, including the cost of necessary guards
and the travel and subsistence expense of prisoners and guards." 28 U.S.C.
§ 567(2) (1982).
Section 0.111 outlines some of the marshals' responsibilities, including:
(b) The service of all civil and criminal process emanating from the
Federal judicial system including the execution of lawful writs and
9
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Atkins dissented from the court's holding that the magistrate lacked stat-
utory authority to allocate transportation costs to the Marshals
Service. 5 3
It is submitted that the Garland decision that the state must bear the
exclusive responsibility for transporting state prisoner witnesses to fed-
eral courthouses could have a grave impact on the protection of prison-
ers' rights. 54 The constitutional right to a fair trial5 5 may be jeopardized
if the petitioner's witnesses cannot be produced at trial. 56 When such
witnesses are prisoners, their live testimony can be obtained only by the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum. 57 Because the
Third Circuit requires a district court to consider the state's ability to
bear the costs of transporting a prisoner witness when deciding whether
to issue such a writ,5 8 the Garland decision to allocate all of the transpor-
court orders pursuant to section 569(b), Title 28, United States
Code.
(d) Administration and implementation of courtroom security re-
quirements for the Federal judiciary.
(j) Receipt, processing and transportation of prisoners held in the
custody of a marshal or transported by the United States Marshals
Service under cooperative or intergovernmental agreements.
28 C.F.R. § 0.111 (1984).
In Wiggins, the Ninth Circuit upheld an order requiring the state to bear all
expenses associated with transporting and securing prisoners' presence at trial.
717 F.2d at 469. In dicta, the Wiggins court stated that "a district court judge has
the discretion to allocate the costs of compliance with a writ ad testificandum in
any number of combinations. These combinations include the clearly preferable
sharing of costs approved in Ballard and Story as well as imposing full costs on
the United States . . . or, as in the instant case, imposing the full costs on the
state." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § § 567(2), 569(b) (1982)).
In Ford, the Eleventh Circuit upheld an order requiring the Marshals Service
to bear the entire cost of compliance with a writ of habeas corpus ad testifi-
candum. 728 F.2d at 1370. The Ford court cited 28 U.S.C. §§ 567(2), 569(a),
(b) in support of its holding that "the district court has the statutory authority to
impose full responsibility on the United States." Id.
53. 737 F.2d at 1292 (Atkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
54. Any petitioner who seeks a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to
obtain the testimony of a prisoner will be affected by the Garland decision. See id.
at 1287-88. It is suggested that the impact of Garland on prisoners will be dis-
proportionately large because prisoners are more likely than other petitioners to
require the testimony of prisoner witnesses.
55. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o per-
son shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
Id.
56. 737 F.2d at 1291 (Becker, J., concurring).
57. For a discussion of the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, see supra
note 9 and accompanying text.
58. See Jerry v. Francisco, 632 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1980). InJerny, a state pris-
oner initiated a § 1983 action against the warden and three prison guards. Id. at
253. At a pretrial hearing, the prisoner requested that the court issue subpoenas
for ten prisoner witnesses and make available law books for trial. Id. The magis-
trate made no ruling on the request for witnesses. Id. During the hearing, the
1985] 1069
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tation costs to the state necessarily weighs against a decision to issue the
writ.59 In a close decision regarding issuance of the writ, the Garland
holding could have the effect of forfeiting the petitioners' ability to ob-
tain testimony from prisoner witnesses merely because of the state's
monetary constraints. 60
As a matter of policy, it is submitted that a more flexible rule giving
district courts discretion to allocate the financial responsibility for trans-
portation between the state and the Marshals Service would better pro-
tect the rights of persons seeking in-court appearances by prisoner
witnesses.6 1 Judges Becker and Atkins both recognized this need for
flexibility in Garland.6 2 Judge Becker specifically noted that a state's lack
prisoner again requested that at least two prisoner witnesses be presented to
testify on his behalf. Id. at 254. The magistrate stated that she would defer her
ruling, pending presentation of the prisoner's case. Id. After the case was
presented, the magistrate failed to inform the prisoner whether the witnesses
were necessary. Id. Subsequently, the prisoner's claim was dismissed. Id.
On appeal, the Third Circuit ruled that the magistrate erred in not consid-
ering evidence that the witnesses could have provided. Id. at 256. The court
recognized that it is within the district court's discretion to issue a writ of habeas
corpus ad testificandum. Id. at 255. The court noted factors, including trans-
portation costs, which the district court must consider in making its decision
regarding issuance of the writ. Id. Here, the trial court did not abuse its discre-
tion, but rather failed to exercise its discretion and this, the Third Circuit con-
cluded, was erroneous. Id.
The Third Circuit in Jerry instructed the district court that in determining
whether to issue a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum it should consider:
the costs and inconvenience of transporting a prisoner from his place
of incarceration to the courtroom, any potential danger or security risk
which the presence of a particular inmate would pose to the court, the
substantiality of the matter at issue, the need for an early determination
of the matter, the possibility of delaying trial until the prisoner is re-
leased .... the integrity of the correctional system, and the interests of
the inmate in presenting his testimony in person rather than by
deposition.
Id. at 255 (quoting Stone v. Morris, 546 F.2d 730, 735-36 (7th Cir. 1976) and
citing In re Warden of Wisconsin State Prison, 541 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1976)).
59. By allocating all the costs of transportation to the state, the Third Cir-
cuit necessarily increased the costs which the trial court must consider in decid-
ing whether to issue the writ.
60. For a case in which the trial court denied a writ of habeas corpus ad
testificandum partially because of transportation costs, see Maurer v. Pitchess,
530 F. Supp. 77 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd in part and rev'd in part without opinion, 755
F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1985). In Maurer, the plaintiff, a state prisoner, initiated an
action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3) against the Los Angeles County Sher-
iff's Department. 530 F. Supp. at 78. Maurer applied for a writ of habeas corpus
ad testificandum to secure his own presence at trial. Id. at 77. The district court
denied his application. Id. at 81. As grounds for the denial, the court stated that
"[t]he expense, the difficulty, and the potential danger of bringing the plaintiff
to court outweigh any benefits that could be secured by the plaintiff's presence."
Id.
61. For a discussion of decisions by the Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
upholding such allocations, see supra notes 4 & 52 and accompanying text.
62. 737 F.2d at 1291-92 (Becker, J., concurring). For a discussion ofJudge
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of financial resources might infringe upon the vindication of a prisoner's
civil rights. 63 Likewise, Judge Atkins cited Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh
Circuit decisions authorizing district courts to divide the responsibility
for transporting witnesses between the state and the Marshals Service. 6
4
It is further submitted that the Third Circuit's decision in Garland
was based on an excessively narrow interpretation of the trial court's
statutory powers. 65 The Third Circuit concluded that there was no stat-
utory authority for the district court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
ad testificandum to the Marshals Service because such writs may be is-
sued only to a prisoner's custodian. 66 In Garland, the court defined cus-
todian narrowly, restricting the term to include only the immediate
custodian, the state prison official. 67 It is suggested that the other cir-
cuit courts of appeals that have addressed this issue have correctly de-
Becker's opinion, see supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of Judge Atkins' opinion, see supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
63. 737 F.2d at 1291-92 (Becker, J., concurring). Judge Becker stated:
But where a district court or magistrate determines that the testimony
of a state prisoner actually would assist a court or jury in its fact finding
capacity, it should not be deterred from obtaining the prisoner because
the state is unable to pay the full costs of witness production and be-
cause the similarly strapped Marshals Service is itself hard pressed to
shoulder any such burden.... Yet, given (1) the requirements ofJerry
v. Francisco that courts consider the costs to the state before issuing an
ad testificandum [writ]; (2) the principle that issuance of an ad testifi-
candum writ lies in the discretion of the trial court; and (3) financial
realities, we fear that, faced with a holding that the court cannot exer-
cise its discretion to order the Marshals and the state to share the costs
of transportation, there may be cases in which the district courts may be
impelled to exercise their discretion to deny ad testificandum writs
when a state is short of funds.
Id.
64. Id. at 1291 (Atkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Ford v. Allen, 728 F.2d 1369, 1370 (11th Cir. 1984); Wiggins v. County of Ala-
meda, 717 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1425 (1984);
Ballard v. Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1977)). See, e.g., Ballard, 557
F.2d at 481. In Ballard, the Fifth Circuit stated that "[o]nce the district court has
determined that the prisoner's presence is essential, the possibility that a lack of
transportation funds or personnel will develop is no justification for refusing to
issue the writ." 557 F.2d at 481 (citing with approval Ball v. Woods, 402 F.
Supp. 803 (N.D. Ala. 1975), afd without opinion sub nom. Ball v. Shamblin, 529
F.2d 520 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 (1976)).
65. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's interpretation of the trial court's
statutory powers, see supra notes 18-38 and accompanying text.
66. 737 F.2d at 1285-86. For a discussion of this conclusion, see supra
notes 32-34 and accompanying text. For a discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 2243, re-
quiring that the respondent to a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum must be
the custodian, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
67. 737 F.2d at 1287. Based on its narrow definition of custodian, the
Third Circuit noted that "it is a long leap from authority to compel custodians to
produce witnesses necessary for the exercise ofjurisdiction, to authority to com-
pel non-custodians to bear the expense of that production simply because they
have access to a deeper pocket." Id. (emphasis in original).
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fined custodian more broadly to include marshals.68 Because custodians
are defined as persons who guard, protect or maintain others,69 mar-
shals would qualify as custodians, especially in light of their § 567(2)
powers. 70 Once marshals are defined as custodians, they are bound to
respond to a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum and to transmit the
prisoner to court.71 Thus, by adopting a broad definition of custodian,
federal courts can avoid the necessity of considering the difficult issue of
district court authority to mandamus federal executive officials, which
the Third Circuit was forced to address in Garland.72
It is suggested that once a court decides that a marshal qualifies as a
custodian, the court must address the underlying question of who will
bear the costs of transportation. Under 28 U.S.C. § 567(2), 73 the Mar-
shals Service may expend federal funds to cover the costs of transport-
ing prisoner witnesses to federal courts.7 4 Although the precise
68. The Ballard, Allen and Wiggins courts did not specifically address the re-
quirement that the respondent to a writ of habeas corpus be a custodian. How-
ever, as the requirement is so fundamental and well recognized, it is submitted
that these circuits implicitly defined custodian to include marshals.
Although these decisions lack precedential value in the Third Circuit, it is
submitted that the similarity between these cases invited the Garland court to
address each of them in detail. The Garland majority, however, failed to discuss
these three factually identical cases from the Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits.
Judge Gibbons merely noted that "[t]he Marshals Service has not fared well in
the other circuits that have considered this issue." 737 F.2d at 1286 n.2.
69. See WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1965).
70. 28 U.S.C. § 567(2)(1982). For the text of § 567(2), see supra note 30.
71. 28 C.F.R. § 0. 111(j) (1984). Section 0.111(j) imposes a duty on mar-
shals to transport prisoners who are held in their custody or who are subject to
cooperative or intergovernmental agreements. Id. It is submitted that because
of its narrow definition of custody the Third Circuit focused on the need for an
intergovernmental agreement to authorize the transportation of prisoners. 737
F.2d at 1285. Because § 0.11 1(j) is framed in the disjunctive, it is submitted that
if the marshals are defined as custodians, no cooperative agreement is required
to authorize the transportation of prisoners. For the text of § 0.111(j), see supra
note 52.
72. It is submitted that if the Third Circuit had defined marshals as custodi-
ans, 28 C.F.R. § 0.111(j) would have provided statutory authority for an order
requiring the marshal to transport prisoner witnesses, obviating the difficult in-
terpretations of McClung, Mclntire and the All Writs Act, which the Third Circuit
was obliged to address. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's interpretation of
Mclntire, McClung, and the All Writs Act, see supra notes 36 & 45-49 and accom-
panying text.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 567(2) (1982).
74. Id. Section 567 provides:
Under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General, each United
States marshal shall be allowed-
(2) the expense of transporting prisoners, including the . . . subsis-
tence expense of prisoners and guards; and
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language of the statute refers to "prisoners" in general terms, the Mar-
shals Service contended in Garland that this statute applies only to federal
prisoners. 75 Yet in its earlier decision in Story, the Third Circuit flatly
refuted this contention by noting that the "Marshal Service's interpreta-
tion . . . [is] more restrictive than that encompassed by the regula-
tions." 76  It is therefore submitted that the Marshals Service is
empowered to bear the costs of transporting state prisoner witnesses.
The ability of the Marshals Service to bear transportation costs will bet-
ter protect persons seeking in-court appearances by prisoner witnesses
because two sources of funds-the Marshals Service and the State-will
be available for this purpose.77
Finally, it is submitted that a third statutory provision regarding the
marshals' obligation to execute writs-28 U.S.C. § 569(b) 7 8-is critical
to the resolution of the issues raised in Garland. In Story, the Third Cir-
cuit decided that the marshals' obligation to execute a writ of habeas
corpus ad testicandum arises only when the state custodian refuses to
execute it.79 It is suggested that an alternative interpretation of section
75. 737 F.2d at 1285.
76. 689 F.2d at 1179. Although the Story holding was implicitly overruled
by the Garland decision, the Story court's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 567(2) is
still valid and well supported. For a further discussion of Story, see supra note 19
and accompanying text.
77. For a discussion of the policy considerations supporting such a deci-
sion, see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 569(b) (1982). For the provisions of § 569(b) regarding the
marshals' obligation to execute writs, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
79. 689 F.2d at 1179. For a further discussion of Story, see supra note 19
and accompanying text. The Third Circuit's conclusion is supported by the pro-
visions of the United States Marshal's Financial Management Manual ofJuly 1, 1975.
The relevant section provides:
STATE PRISONERS
Expenses Incident to Production Prisoners in Federal Court-
If the state authorities desire to produce the requested prisoner at the
place of trial under state guard, the state should advance the guard and
prisoner the necessary expenses for travel. The U.S. Marshal should reim-
burse the state for the expenses and advance any remaining necessary allowances,
all of which are to be charged to "Fees and Expenses of Witness" appropriation.
However, because of the excess costs involved in this procedure, the
U.S. Attorney has been instructed that it would be more preferable to
have the prisoner placed in the custody of the U.S. Marshal of the dis-
trict in which the state institution is located.
State prisoners in the temporary custody of the U.S. Marshal cannot be
turned over to a second state requesting custody. It is the Marshals
Service's position that in Federal civil rights suits filed by state prison-
ers against state officials the state should transport the prisoner to and
from the Federal Court and bear any of the prisoners [sic] having ex-
penses. The Marshals Service should not reimburse the state for any of
their expenses. If the Marshal is ordered to transport such prisoners,
the United States Marshals Service Legal Counsel should be immedi-
ately notified.
UNITED STATES MARSHALS FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT MANUAL 340:26 (July 1, 1975)
(emphasis supplied in first paragraph only).
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569(b) has been accepted by the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.8 0 Under
this alternative approach, derived from the plain meaning of the stat-
ute,8 1 a marshal is obligated to execute a writ if it is lawful. 82
In light of the important policy of protecting prisoners' rights,8 3
and consistent with interpretations of the pertinent statutes by other cir-
cuits,84 it is submitted that the Third Circuit erred in that part of its
Garland decision which requires the states to bear the entire burden of
transporting state prisoner witnesses to federal courthouses. 85 It is fur-
ther submitted that by placing the financial burden of transporting pris-
oner witnesses solely upon the state, the Third Circuit has increased the
80. See Ford v. Carballo, 577 F.2d 404 (7th Cir. 1978); Ballard v. Spradley,
557 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1977). In Carballo, which involved a prisoner's
§ 1983 claim, the district court issued a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum
directing both the marshal and the state prison warden to produce Ford-a state
prisoner-at trial. 577 F.2d at 405. Although the writ issued was ad prose-
quendum, the court noted that it was effectively a writ of habeas corpus ad tes-
tificandum because its function was to bring the witness into court to testify. Id.
at 407 n. 1. The marshal served the writ on the warden and informed him that
the United States Marshals Service would not transport Ford. Id. at 406. In re-
sponse to the writ, the warden produced the prisoner at trial and maintained
custody of him throughout the trial. Id. After the trial, the warden requested
reimbursement from the marshals for the cost of transporting and guarding
Ford during trial. Id. The district court denied this request. Id. On appeal, the
Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that "it was an abuse of [trial court's] discretion
to later refuse the state's request for reimbursement of the costs in carrying out
that order." Id. at 408. The court noted that § 569(b) required a marshal to
execute a properly issued writ. Id. at 407.
81. For the text of § 569(b), see supra note 6.
82. See Ford v. Carballo, 577 F.2d 404, 407 (7th Cir. 1978); Ballard v.
Spradley, 557 F.2d 476, 481 (5th Cir. 1977). The Carballo court elaborated:
We do note, however, and consider it a serious matter, that the
Marshal decided that all that was necessary on his part was to notify the
Warden that the Marshal's Service would not transport the prisoner.
Although a motion to modify the writ had been filed, that motion had
not been relied upon at the time of trial and 28 U.S.C. § 569(b) clearly
required that the Marshal execute the writ. The fact that a controversy
may have existed as to who should actually transport and suffer the ex-
pense of producing the prisoner had no effect upon the existing writ
and did not authorize the Marshal to independently disregard a direct
order of the court.
577 F.2d at 407.
83. For a discussion of the policy considerations arising from the Garland
decision, see supra notes 54-63 and accompanying text.
84. For a discussion of the interpretations of the pertinent statutes by other
circuits, see supra note 52 and accompanying text.
85. In a second part of the Garland decision, the Third Circuit stated that
marshals must assume custody of state prisoner witnesses while they are in a
federal courthouse to testify. 737 F.2d at 1287. Section 569(a) clearly autho-
rizes such an interpretation. See 28 U.S.C. § 569(a) (1982). For a discussion of
the other, more controversial part of the Garland decision, see supra notes 15-38
and accompanying text.
1074 [Vol. 30: p. 1060
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undesirable possibility that the state's finances may limit the production
of such witnesses in federal court. 86
Kathleen M. Gregor
86. For a discussion of how this possibility could arise, see supra notes 54-
63 and accompanying text.
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